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Appellants The Idaho Company ("Idaho Company"), Sky Enterprises, LLC ("Sky") and
William F. Rigby ("Rigby") submit the following reply brief in accordance with I.A.R. 33(c).

ill.
A.

REPLY ARGUMENT

Material Disputed Facts.
1.

Summary judgment standard.

Appellees Jerry Losee and JoCarol Losee ("the Lo sees") argue that because this action
will be tried before the Court without a jury, the trial court was "free to arrive at the most
probable inferences." 1 However, those inferences must be drawn from uncontroverted facts:

"Where the evidentiary facts are not disputed, and the trial court rather than a jury will be the
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences,
because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences."

2

In this case, the evidentiary facts upon which the summary judgment was based are disputed, and
the trial court was therefore not entitled to "arrive at the most probable inferences," since
disputed facts must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, and the issue
of inferences relating to those facts was never reached.

1

Respondent's Brief, p. 3.

2

Jenkins v. Barsalu, 145 Idaho 202,205, 177 P.3d 949,952 (2008), citing Riverside Dev.
Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 647,661 (1982) (emphasis added).
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2.

Disputed facts.

In granting partial summary judgment, the trial court apparently relied upon the following
facts 3 asse1ted by the Losees, each of which is disputed by Appellants:
DISPUTED FACT NO. 1: Idaho Company agreed to purchase its membership interest in
Sky Enterprises, LLC, for $135,000 cash.
·
Idaho Company did not agree to provide cash to purchase its membership interest in Sky
Enterprises, and the contract between the parties did not require that they do so. The
Membership Purchase Agreement, signed by all paities, provides, at Section 2: "It is understood
that the Investor"s Capital Contribution may be in the form of assistance with obtaining an
operating credit line for Sky Enterprises, L.L.C."4 Appellants' position is further supported by
testimony given by Appellee JoCarol Losee, under oath, in a previous legal proceeding, Baimock
County Case No. CV-04-4501-OC, wherein she testified she understood the $135,000 was a loan
which would have to be repaid. 5
The obligation to repay the initial$ 135,000 did not fall on the Losees personally; rather
Sky Enterprises was obligated to pay Idaho Company from future profits. All parties agreed to
this contractual provision. While at first glance it may not appear that Idaho Company was
risking anything, or paying anything for its one-half interest in the limited liability company, it is
important to remember that this was a high-risk venture, and the Losees agreed to the terms. It is

3

It is difficult to determine exactly what the trial court relied upon because the trial court
failed to make findings of fact or conclusions oflaw.
4

R., Vol. I, p. 81.

5

R. Supp., pp. 54-55.
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fair to assume that the Losees had been unable to secure financing elsewhere, and that they were
unable to proceed without financial backing. Finally, it is important to remember that to date,
Idaho Company has not been repaid any part of its investment, which now totals well over
$300,000. Under Idaho law, competent adults are free to enter into contracts and to negotiate
terms among themselves. For the trial court to second-guess those negotiations, and to do so in
the context of sunnnary judgment, is contrary to well-established principles of Idaho law.
DISPUTED FACT NO. 2: Appellants never paid the consideration for the purchase of its
membership interest.
Defendant Idaho Company did provide financing, in the amount of $135,000, as agreed
to by all parties. JoCarol Losee admitted, under oath, that the $135,000 was received and
6

expended by Sky during the time the Lo sees were in charge of managing the business. In
addition, Rigby's affidavit states: "Idaho Company fulfilled its obligation to Sky under the
Membership Purchase Agreement by providing an operating line of credit to Sky in the sum of
$135,000."7
DISPUTED FACT NO. 3: Appellants forced the Losees to sign a Promissory Note and
Deed of Trust, encumbering the Losees' personal residence. The Losees did not understand they
had personal liability for the loans, and it was unfair that they should be personally liable.
The Losees came to Idaho Company in the spring of 2004 to request additional funding;
Appellants did not go to the Losees. 8 In fact, the Losees requested that the original credit line of

6

R. Supp., pp. 83-85.
R. Supp., p. 13, 1 3.

7
8

Id., 4.
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$135,000 be nearly doubled. JoCarol Losee testified she was aware that the Losees were
pledging their personal residence as security for the debt.

9

In the context of evaluating the Losees' claim, it is important to remember that a good
portion of the funds expended were utilized to construct a garage/shop building on the Losees'
property, which they retain. The building is substantial, and increases the value of the Losees'
property. It is also important to remember that Appellants' Counterclaim, on file with the trial
court, together with Rigby' s affidavit, allege significant improprieties on the part of the Lo sees,
including fraud, diversion of Sky funds for their own use and benefit, and mismanagement of
company funds. The trial court has not heard testimony and evidence regarding these matters,
nor has it had an opportunity to fairly evaluate the claims and counterclaims of the parties or to
determine the credibility of witnesses. Summary judgment, where disputed facts exist, is not the
proper forum to make such evaluations.
The additional funding provided by Idaho Company constituted consideration for the
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust under any standard, and was a modification to the original
contracts between the parties. This Court has held that "the doing by one of the parties of
something that he is not legally bound to do constitutes consideration for the other's promise to
modify the terms of the original agreement. " 10 Under the terms of the original agreements
between the parties, Idaho Company was obliged to finance only $135,000 of Sky expenses. The

9

R., Supp., p. 73, 11. 11-19, p. 74, 11. 11-14, pp. 83-85.

10 Great

Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 769, 979 P.2d
627,642 (1998).
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Losees were not obliged to repay that amount. However, as JoCarol Losee testified, there came
a time when $135,000 was not enough. She also testified that the garage/shop came to be an
expensive facility. 11 Presumably, part of the reason the Losees agreed to sign the Promissory
Note and Deed of Trust was so that the garage/shop could be finished, thereby enhancing the
value of their property. Again, these are matters to be presented and evaluated at trial, so that
factual questions can be fully explored and resolved. They are not matters that are ripe for
summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings.
It is undisputed that the Losees agreed, in writing, to be personally responsible for funds

advanced by Idaho Company in exchange for Idaho Company advancing substantial additional
funds. It is important to remember that the additional funds were granted iifter Idaho Company
became aware of serious mismanagement of Sky by the Losees. Appellants submit that the
evidence at trial will show that Idaho Company was reluctant to commit additional funds, and
was having second thoughts as to the viability of Sky. Idaho Company had received reports that
Sky was being mismanaged by the Losees at this juncture, and were understandably concerned
about advancing additional money. 12 At trial, Idaho Company will submit testimony that it
would not have advanced the funds, absent the grant of security by the Losees. Idaho Company
took a considerable risk in advancing the additional funds. A reasonable person could certainly
find that it was part of the bargain, and fair, that the Losees take some risk also.

11

R. Supp., pp. 83-85.

12

R. Supp., pp. 32-33.
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The July 2004 agreements meet all of the tests for mutuality of obligation. It is a wellestablished principle of contract law tbat "contracts do not necessarily give identical rights to all
parties. That is part of the bargaining process. " 13 Whether or not the trial court, with the scant
evidence before it, believed the July 2004 agreements were fair or unfair, or were a good or bad
bargain for the Losees, could not be grounds for a grant of summary judgment, given the
enormity of the disputed facts in tbis case.
DISPUTED FACT NO. 4: The Deed of Trust and Promissory Note were either void or
voidable, and lacked consideration.
As argued supra, the advance of an additional $126,000 constituted consideration for the
Deed of Trust and Promissory Note. The Idaho Courts have held "adequacy of consideration to
be a matter exclusively for the decision of the parties." 14 In this case, the Losees agreed, at the
time they signed the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust, that the consideration was adequate.
They accepted the consideration, and expended it, in part for their own benefit.

15

They now seek

to repudiate the contract; however, they have not tendered back the consideration they received,
nor have they repaid either Sky or Idaho Company for funds they utilized for their own benefit.
The Losees have not argued that their contract with Appellants was illegal, that it was
illusory, or that it violated public policy. Indeed, they cannot do so, because such clearly is not

13

Doughty v. Idaho Frozen Foods Corp., 112 Idaho 79 l, 794, 736 P .2d 460, 463 (Ct.
App. 1987).
14

Jd, 112 Idaho at 463.

15

In addition to the garage/shop building, they have retained a motor vehicle and bedroom
set purchased with Sky funds. They also have admitted to diverting Sky funds to pay their own
personal household bills and expenses.
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the case. Because this theory was not presented to the trial court until oral argument on the
motion for partial summary judgment, it is difficult to determine the Losees' basis for the claim,
or what the trial court relied upon in making its ruling from the bench. The Idaho Court of
Appeals has stated that"[o)nly in special circumstances may a court of equity set aside contracts
fairly and freely negotiated." 16 Certainly the trial court was without sufficient testimony and
evidence to make that determination at this juncture. This case is rife with factual disputes
which cannot be resolved without a trial on the merits.
DISPUTED FACT NO. 5: The Losees were told the Deed of Trust would not be
recorded.
This contention by the Losees is directly contradicted by testimony of Rigby in his
affidavit. Rigby testified that he explained the purpose of the Deed of Trust was to secure the
Idaho Company loan, that he specifically informed them the Deed of Trust would be recorded,
and that it was, in fact recorded in Bannock County, and was a matter of public record.

17

DISPUTED FACT NO. 6: The contract documents are contradictory.
The Losees also point to ambiguities and/or conflicting provisions in the contract
documents. In particular; they direct this Court's attention to a provision in the Operating
Agreement regarding debts incurred by Sky Enterprises, arguing that it negates the provisions of
the Membership Purchase Agreement. Appellants do not believe the documents contradict one
another, or that the Losees have properly interpreted the Operating Agreement. However, if a

16

Hershey v. Simpson, 111 Idaho 491,494, 725 P.2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1986).

17

R. Supp., pp. 13-14, 9-12.
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conflict between the two documents exists, rendering either or both ambiguous, Idaho law is
clear:
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found
ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is
18
ambiguous is a question oflaw.
In this case, if the contracts in question are ambiguous, i.e. subject to more than one
plausible interpretation, or self-contradictory, when construed together, then summary judgment
cannot lie because a question of fact exists. The trial court was then required to look to extrinsic
evidence to determine the intent of the parties at the time the contracts were executed,

19

precluding entry of summary judgment.
In Land O'Lakes v. Bray, 20 the trial court did not merely draw inferences from
uncontroverted facts, but also made credibility determinations and made findings regarding
disputed facts. The Idaho Court of Appeals, overturning the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, held that this was impermissible on sununary judgment, even when the court would be
the fact finder at trial:

18

Jntermountain Eye and Laser Centers, PLLCv. Miller, 142 Idaho 218,222, 127 P.3d
121, 125 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
19

See, e.g. Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 130 Idaho I 05, I 07, 937 P.2d 417, 419

(1997).
20

138 Idaho 817, 69 P.3d 1078 (Ct. App. 2003).
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The legal standard allowing a trial court presented with a summary judgment
motion to draw inferences favorable to the movant is to be applied only in the
face of undisputed facts. When evidence on material issues is in conflict, the
21
evidentiary facts must be viewed in favor of the party opposing the motion.
In this case, like Land O'Lakes, the trial court erred when it failed to construe the
disputed evidentiary facts in favor of Appellants. The trial court's grant of partial
summary judgment to the Losees was in error, and should be reversed on appeal.

B.

Quasi-Estoppel.

The Losees' mischaracterize Appellant's argument regarding the doctrine of quasiestoppel. The claim is predicated upon JoCarol Losee's testimony in previous litigation that she
knew that the Lava Home was being used as collateral for the $261,000 loan and that Idaho
Company could look to the Lava Home for security as an alternate means of collecting its debt.

22

Thereafter, in the instant litigation, Mrs. Losee asserted that "[n]either my husband nor I
understood that our execution of these documents [Promissory Note and Deed of Trust] would
amount to a lien against our home and real property."23 While the Losees' signature on the loan
documents and Deed of Trust also supports Appellants' position, it is Mrs. Losee' s clear
testimony that she understood what was being done, and knew a lien was being placed on the
property which should invoke the doctrine of quasi-estoppel to prevent her later assertion to the
contrary.

21

Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Bray, 138 Idaho 817,819, 69 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ct. App. 2003),
emphasis in original.
22

R., Supp. p. 74, 11. 4-25, p. 75, IL 11-14.

23

R., Vol. II, p. 199, ,I 14.
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C.

Failure to Enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The trial court's failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions oflaw make it difficult
to determine basis for the grant of summary judgment. The Losees' recitation of"salient
undisputed facts" in Respondent's Brief adds no clarity to the problem, and ignores other facts,
including the Losees' personal use of Sky funds and their retention of the garage/shop building
erected with loan proceeds. These issues complicate the alleged "simplicity of the factual
dispute." Moreover, under the facts set forth by the Losees, the trial court had no basis to void
the Deed of Trust and Promissory Note in their entirety. Even were the Losees' "salient
undisputed facts" construed to support a reduction for the $135,000 operating line initially
provided to the company, they do not support setting aside the entirety of the $261,000
obligation.
The trial court's brevity also blurs the line between facts and inferences from those facts.
Because the underlying facts upon which the court relied in granting partial summary judgment
are not delineated, it is likewise impossible to determine what inferences the trial court drew, and
from what source. All of these factors militate against sustaining the trial court's determination
regarding the partial summary judgment.

D.

Attorneys Fees and Costs on Appeal.

As argued in Appellants' Brief; the Appellants are entitled to their attorney's fees and
costs pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Trust, Promissory Note and Security Agreement.
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In the alternative, Appellants should be awarded their attorney's fees and costs pursuant
to LC.§§ 12-120 and 12-121.

VI.

CONCLUSION

This case is replete with genuine issues of material fact which are in dispute. The trial
court failed to properly construe those facts in favor of the party opposing summary judgment,
and instead, apparently gave the moving party the benefit of not only inferences drawn from the
evidence before it, but of the construction of the facts themselves. As this Court has previously
stated, motions for summary judgment should be granted with caution, and in this case it was
inappropriate. The grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the Losees should be reversed,
and Appellants should be awarded their attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2-r'J.ay of February, 2009.

;7

E.W. Pike & Associates, P.A.
Attorneys for Appellants
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VII.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be served two true and correct copies of the foregoing, to
the following, by the indicated method on this ;__]6day of February, 2009, by U.S. mail, hand
delivery or facsimile, with the necessary postage affixed thereto.
Nick L. Nielson
P. 0. Box 6159
Pocatello, ID 83205-6159
Craig R. Jorgensen
P. 0. Box 4904
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904
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[,K] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivered
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[ ] Fax
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